Sacred Subterfuge: Stories of Deception in the Talmud
Reviewing the dozens of narratives related to deception present in the Talmud
Part of a new series. Based on my previous research. Full draft of my research is available at my Academia.edu page, here (requires registration): “A Preliminary analysis of stories of deception in the Talmud”
These narratives of deception in the Talmud will be systematically categorized based on the motivations behind the deceptive behavior. Almost all of the relevant sources, where Talmudic Sages partake in a wide variety of deceptions, are not stated as explicit permissions, but since there is no explicit critique by the redactor, there is implied acceptability. Some of the more blatant cases of untruths can be shown to likely be conjectures of the Stammaim, who, for their own programmatic reasons, retrojected untruths onto past sages.
The current study adopts a multi-disciplinary approach that draws on recent advancements in the fields of Talmud studies and philosophical analysis of deception. The aim is to create an initial taxonomy of these deceptive narratives based on contemporary philosophy of deception and to conduct an initial analysis of the narratives using contemporary methods of source criticism.
It is worth noting that I did not conduct a comprehensive review of previous scholarship for each narrative, or perform a thorough textual analysis of each source. Therefore, the results should be considered as initial findings that may be revised with further research. However, a significant number of texts have been analyzed, which provides a strong basis for the conclusions.
Previous scholarship
R' Yosef Hayyim in his responsum on the topic in Shu”t Torah Lishmah (1976) lists over 39 Talmudic sources which reveal permissive attitudes by Talmudic sages. It thus includes most of the sources I analyze.
Dratch (1988), Resnicoff (2002), Yosef (2016) are focused on analyzing normative rules, based on Talmud and post-Talmud sources.
See also the treatment in Zivotovsky (1993).
The most recent and best treatment is that of Marc Shapiro (2015). In a book on Jewish censorship of Jewish texts, Shapiro devotes a chapter to normative statements and stories of deception in the Talmud. However, due to the focus of his book, Shapiro is focused on the historical understanding of Talmud, and the precedent it sets. In addition, he focuses on cases where the impact of the lies is on halacha, as opposed to the motivations of the liar.
My innovation in this paper, compared to previous research, is to closely read the Talmudic texts, using modern historical-critical tools. In addition, in contrast to previous research, my perspective is specifically on stories and individual psychological motivations (as reflected in the redacted stories).
Terminology - English and Hebrew
My intention in this article is to analyze the Talmudic sources as objectively as possible, based on prior research. My usage of terms such as "liar" should be understood in the judgment-free sense of “someone who says something which he knows not to be true”, and is not meant to be understood in the judgmental sense.[1]
The term used for “telling a white lie” often used in rabbinic writing is “משנה בדיבורו”, as well as other related Aramaic terms used in the Talmud:
שנ"ה (“משנו במלייהו”)
חל"ף (“מחליף בדיבורו”)
הפ"ך (“תיפוך במילי”):
סנהדרין צב ע"א:
ואמר רבי אלעזר: כל המחליף בדיבורו כאילו עובד עבודה זרה
רש"י שם:
מחליף בדיבורו - משנה בדבורו, שלא יהא ניכר.
פסחים קיג ע"א:
רב הדריך את רב כהנא: "הפוך בנבילתא ולא תיפוך במילי" .
שח"ד ("שחודי שחדיה במילי"):
Sanhedrin 43b:
תן תודה
אמר רבינא שחודי שחדיה במילי
כלום נבקש ממך אלא הודאה תן לו תודה והיפטר
מיד ויען עכן את יהושע ויאמר אמנה אנכי חטאתי לה' אלהי ישראל וכזאת וכזאת עשיתי
רש"י שם:
שחדיה במילי - השחידו בשוחד דברים עד שהודה שכשאמר לו תן לו תודה סבור שאין מבקשין ממנו אלא הודאה ולא יהרגוהו:
These terms, of course, can be literally translated as “changing his speech”. The term is clearly meant to be euphemistic. The stronger, non-euphemistic terms used by the Talmud, and by extension in Talmudic interpreters, are as follows (lemma, followed by ways used):
שק"ר
טע"ה (מטעה)
שט"ה (משטה)
ער"מ (אערמומי):
Shabbat 129a
א"ל רב נחמן לרבנן במטותא מנייכו ביומא דהקזה אמרו לביתייכו נחמן איקלע לגבן
וכולא אערומי אסירי בר מהאי עורמא דשרי.
בד"ה (מבדה):
שבועות דף ל"א ע"א:
מנין לתלמיד שאמר לו רבו יודע אתה בי שאם נותנים לי מאה מנה איני מבדה
all of which are used in Talmudic sources, to be discussed.
A possible indication that manipulation with words is considered by the Talmudic sages to be less bad than manipulation by physical force (to be contrasted with the Kantian perspective, that sees a harmful lie as philosophically equivalent equivalent to physical coercion), can be seen in the language used by the Talmud: “במלתא בעלמא הוא דאוקמיה” . See also the term used in aggada about Joshua and Achan, where the Talmud posist that Joshua lied to Achan, in order to elicit a confession: “שחודי שחדיה במילי”, literally meaning that “he bribed him with words”.
Explicit permissions to deceive
There are a few places where the Talmud explicitly states that it’s permitted to deceive. I have found a total of six such cases. The first four are white lies, where there is no impact on the halachic process. The fifth (אם בקשת ליחנק היתלה באילן גדול) is the most surprising, as according to one interpretation, it gives permission to lie to impact halacha. The sixth is permission to lie to workers in order to prevent a financial loss.:
Bava Metzia 23b-24a: בהני תלת מילי עבידי רבנן דמשנו במלייהו במסכת ובפוריא ובאושפיזא
Shabbat 129a: א"ל רב נחמן לרבנן במטותא מנייכו ביומא דהקזה אמרו לביתייכו נחמן איקלע לגבן וכולא אערומי אסירי בר מהאי עורמא דשרי.
Ketubot 16b-17a: תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן כֵּיצַד מְרַקְּדִין לִפְנֵי הַכַּלָּה [...] וּבֵית הִלֵּל אוֹמְרִים כַּלָּה נָאָה וַחֲסוּדָה [...] מִכָּאן אָמְרוּ חֲכָמִים לְעוֹלָם תְּהֵא דַּעְתּוֹ שֶׁל אָדָם מְעוֹרֶבֶת עִם הַבְּרִיּוֹת
Yevamot 65b = Bava Metzia 87a: גדול שלום שאפי' הקב"ה שינה בו
Pesachim 112a: אם בקשת ליחנק היתלה באילן גדול. There are a few ways to interpret this, but Shapiro (2015) documents that a number of major interpreters explain that it permits lying.
Bava Metzia 76b: במה דברים אמורים בדבר שאין אבוד אבל בדבר האבוד שוכר עליהן או מטען . כיצד מטען אומר להן סלע קצצתי לכם באו וטלו שתים ועד כמה שוכר עליהן עד ארבעים וחמשים זוז. The beraita cited by the Talmud says that one may not deceive workers in a case that does not involve “financial loss” (“דבר האבד”) due to a work stoppage. However, in a case of financial loss, one may deceive. Interestingly, this distinction corresponds well to Camden’s distinction (Camden 1984, pg. 312-313) between a lie for “acquisition of resources (I.A)” and a lie for “protection of resources (I.B)”.
[1] It can be conjectured that the topic of stories of deception in the Talmud may be relatively under-studied due to the politically sensitive nature of the topic.