Is There Pesak for Belief in Orthodox Judaism?

Exploring the intersection of belief and halachic authority

In cases of dispute about Halacha, there are methods whereby decisors will reach a final decision (“pesak”) that is binding on practitioners of Judaism.¹ Is there pesak in hashkafa (belief)? In other words, is there a possibility in Judaism of a binding requirement to believe something? This is a hot-button issue that has come up again and again in contemporary times. As has often been pointed out, this topic becomes especially relevant when there are break-away groups who develop different beliefs. Are such groups now beyond the pale of acceptable beliefs? Or can we say that they, too, have a right to their opinion?^[1]

There are a number of basic Talmudic, philosophical and psychological issues that are relevant.

The Talmud Bavli in two places discusses whether there is a possibility of a binding decision regarding halachic issues that are not applicable nowadays. Both sugyot are set up essentially the same way. Here is how the sugya appears in Sanhedrin 51b:[2]

אמר רב נחמן אמר רבה בר אבוה אמר רב:

הלכה כדשלח רבין משמיה דרבי יוסי ברבי חנינא.

אמר רב יוסף הלכתא למשיחא?!

Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuha says that Rav says: The halakha in this matter is in accordance with the explanation that Ravin sent in the name of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina. Rav Yosef said in response: Does one issue a halakha for the messianic period? Since the destruction of the Temple, courts do not have the authority to adjudicate capital cases (see 52b), and this authority will be restored only once the Temple is rebuilt, in the messianic period. Therefore, what is the purpose of stating the halakha in this matter when it is not currently relevant?

א"ל אביי: אלא מעתה שחיטת קדשים לא ליתני, הלכתא למשיחא

אלא דרוש וקבל שכר, הכא נמי דרוש וקבל שכר

Abaye said to him: If that is so, let the tanna not teach all the halakhot of the slaughter of sacrificial animals, i.e., tractate Zevaḥim, as it is entirely a halakha for the messianic period. Rather, one studies these halakhot due to the principle of: Study Torah and receive reward, i.e., one is rewarded for the study of Torah regardless of its practical applicability. Here too, study Torah and receive reward.

הכי קאמרי: הלכתא למה לי, סוגיא דשמעתא הלכה קאמר

Rav Yosef responded: This is what I meant to say: Why do I need the halakha with regard to this subject to be stated? Is a halakha stated in the discussion of Rabbi Eliezer’s statement? The statements of the amora’im are merely explanations of how to understand the wording of Rabbi Eliezer’s statement, but there is no difference between them with regard to the halakha.

Thinking versus Expressing

As we will see, when it comes to hashkafa there are those that differentiate between simply thinking something and actually vocalizing that belief. For example, there may be a difference between simply thinking that there will be no actual Messiah, and expressing such a belief to another. I’d like to compare this to the contemporary, Western, view. There was a point when voicing subversive ideas in public was a crime. (I would say “unpopular ideas”, but the truth is that it is not so much important if it is unpopular as it is if those in power—and have the ability to punish--are opposed to it.) In England this could get one in trouble for sedition. Secular law focuses mostly on actions. To a lesser extent, secular law limits free speech, famously prohibiting “yelling fire in a theater”, as well as other forms of speech, such as hate speech. But even limiting hate speech is hotly contested, and any possible encroaching on free speech is looked at suspiciously. The rule of the day is that if it doesn’t bother someone else, there is no reason that it should be limited.

Now, onto the second option mentioned above, pesak in simple belief without vocalizing it. To the Western mind it seems especially foreign for beliefs to be legislated. Limiting “free thought” is not even discussed. Of course, in many dictatorships, brainwashing is the rule of the day, and presumably if they had the ability they would prohibit and punish subversive thoughts. However, as of now, such “crimes” are unenforceable, and therefore only in dystopian novels like “1984” is free thought prohibited.

Even more fundamentally, is there any point in legislating belief? Seemingly, if one does not believe something, it seems difficult to say that he can force himself to believe it simply because it has been decided that he must. Whether one can force herself to change her beliefs by sheer willpower is a question for psychologists.^[3]

Another issue which must be aired is whether it makes philosophical sense to pasken beliefs. There has been discussion by philosophers whether one can be an intellectually honest parochialist. In other words, does it make sense for a person to believe that his own belief system is the only correct one, when it is opposed by a large number of intelligent, well thought-out people that that person himself respects? This is a problem with all exclusivist belief systems. There is as yet no consensus among philosophers. According to the opinion that one cannot be an intellectually honest exclusivist, it would likewise not make philosophical sense to decide definitively between two opinions, like one opinion to the exclusion of the other. In other words, if one accepts upon himself the Jewish religion, and yet has a universalist world view and accepts the coherence of other religions and world views, it does not make sense not to accept differences of opinion within Judaism itself. (Assuming, of course, that both opinions are coherent, and therefore viable.)

There is another philosophical issue which is problematic even for the non-exclusivist Jew. That is, whether it makes philosophical sense to follow a religiously mandated ban on inquiry into the basis of that religion. In other words, is it intellectually honest to listen to a command not to inquire whether the command itself is binding? This is not relevant to the issue of pesak in hashkafa per se, but with the prohibition of studying heresy.

The reason I mention it is because it relates to the issue of required beliefs. In the wake of Marc Shapiro’s book Limits of Orthodox Theology: Maimonides' Thirteen Principles Reappraised (2003), many people, such as Gil Student, claimed that there is a difference between “hashkafah” and “foundational beliefs”, or dogma. “Hashkafah” denotes beliefs that are not basic, while “foundational beliefs” are basic beliefs--dogma. The “foundational beliefs” are roughly the thirteen ikkarim of Maimonides.^[4] Not only must one believe in these “foundational beliefs”, but one is not even allowed to inquire into their possible falseness.

According to Maimonides, it is prohibited to inquire into the existence of God. But if God does not exist, then the prohibition has no basis, and there is no problem in inquiring into His existence. It would therefore seem irrational to prohibit such inquiry on a religious basis. This is a problem with the requirement to believe in the existence of God, as well as the requirement to believe in the veracity of the Torah—Maimonides' first and sixth ikkarim.

This issue has been debated at length by Parnes on the one hand—the more conservative side—and Kaplan and Shatz on the other. But none of them stress this fact: That the opinion that prohibits inquiry completely (Parnes) does not seem to be philosophically sustainable.^[5]

Bibliography

Bechofer, “Pesak” = Yosef Gavriel Bechoffer, “Does ‘pesak’ apply to matters of ‘hashkafa’?”, Journal of Halacha and Contemporary Society 67 (2014): pp. 23-36. Available here and here.

Jerome Gellman, “Religious Diversity” = Jerome Gellman, “Religious Diversity and the Epistemic Justification of Religious Belief”, Faith and Philosophy Volume 10, Issue 3, (July 1993): pp. 345-364. Available here.

Henshke, “On the Borders” = דוד הנשקה, "על גבולותיה של הכרעת הלכה: לתולדות שיטת הרמב"ם ולגלגולי שיטות שברקעה", דעת 61 (קיץ תשס"ו): עמ' 49-72. See also the discussion here.

Shapiro, “Pesak” = Marc B. Shapiro, “Is There a ‘Pesak’ for Jewish Thought?”, in Jewish Thought and Jewish Belief, ed. Daniel J. Lasker (Beer Sheva: Ben Gurion University of the Negev Press, 2012), *119-*140.

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^[1] The issue of pesak in hashkafa has been discussed by many. See T. Y. Kook, Liebowitz, Shapiro, Henshke, Shapiro, R. Y. G. Bechoffer. For full bibliographical information, see bibliography at the end of the article. Henshke’s and Shapiro’s discussions were especially helpful, and later on I will discuss their disagreement as to the opinion of Maimonides. The topic is something I have been interested in for many years, and I would like to thank all those that I have discussed the issue with, especially R’ Mattis Roberts, Yehuda Katz, and R’ Meir Triebetz.

^[2] Steinzaltz-Koren translation, as it appears online at Sefaria. I added punctuation to the Hebrew, based on the translation. For all the important textual variations and a detailed analysis of these passages, see Henshke, ‘On the Borders’, pg. 62ff.

^[3] This issue is also discussed by Rishonim. See Shapiro, article, footnote.

^[4] Interestingly, Shapiro in his article does not relate to this distinction between beliefs in general and dogma, even though the article was written much later than the review to his book. The term “foundational beliefs” is taken from Bechoffer.

^[5] Gellman seems to support this argument. But I do not understand his argument.

1. I wrote this paper in 2014, while studying for a Master’s Degree in Yeshiva University.