Orthodox Judaism, Religious Coercion, and Halacha

Many believe that Jewish tradition doesn't endorse religious coercion, but the truth is quite the opposite

Abstract 

There’s a popular idea in more liberal streams of Orthodox Judaism that Judaism doesn’t believe in religious coercion. Contradicting this view, Prof. Eliav Shochetman states in a 1996 article that the Orthodox halacha requiring religious coercion is a straightforward one that no halachist disagrees with. This halacha is primarily based on a baraita quoted in Talmud Bavli (Ketubot 86a - 86b) which states that if one refuses to perform a positive commandment, he is whipped until he does the mitzva, and if he continues to refuse, the whipping continues, until he dies of the beating. This religiously coercive tendency is taken even further by Maimonides, who states in Mishneh Torah that any gentile living under Jewish rule who worships idols or violates any other Laws of Noah, must be put to death.

Keywords

Religious coercion; Flagellation; Jewish courts; Talmud; halacha; כפייה דתית; כופין אותו עד שיאמר רוצה אני; מלקות; בית דין; הלכה; תלמוד בבלי

There’s a popular idea in more liberal streams of Orthodox Judaism that Judaism doesn’t believe in religious coercion. I have heard this idea multiple times over the past 15 years. 

I accept that, as Gershom Scholem famously said, Judaism is whatever Jews do. And by extension, Jewish beliefs are whatever Jews believe. But when someone states that “ Judaism doesn’t believe in X”, they typically mean that this belief is objectively invalid, taking into account mainstream Jewish literature of the last 3000 years.¹ 

In this context, it's apparent that the reality is the exact opposite of the popular liberal belief: Predominant rabbinic texts expressly affirm that religious commandments should be enforced.

As a staunch classical liberal, I am vehemently against any form of religious coercion. Indeed, one of my most firmly held convictions is opposition to coercion and violence.² However, as a person committed to intellectual honesty and deeply fascinated by intellectual history, it irks me to hear the inaccurate claim that "Judaism doesn’t believe in religious coercion". This statement is simply historically incorrect.³

The basic source is a following passage in the Talmud Bavli (Ketubot 86a - 86b, translation Koren-Steinzaltz). It states that if one refuses to perform a positive commandment, he is whipped until he does the mitzva. If he continues to refuse, the whipping continues, until he dies of the beating:

תנינא: במה דברים אמורים — במצות לא תעשה, אבל במצות עשה, כגון שאומרין לו עשה סוכה ואינו עושה, לולב ואינו עושה, מכין אותו עד שתצא נפשו.

“We already learned this halakha in a baraita: In what case is this statement said, that one is liable to receive forty lashes for committing a transgression? It is said with regard to negative mitzvot. However, with regard to positive mitzvot, for example, if the court says to someone: Perform the mitzva of the sukka, and he does not do so, or: Perform the mitzva of the palm branch, and he does not do so, the court strikes him an unlimited number of times, even until his soul departs, in order to force him to perform the mitzva.” 

Prof. Eliav Shochetman has a lengthy, open-access article in Hebrew reviewing the topic of religious coercion in halacha (כופין על המצוות).⁴ He states that the law requiring religious coercion is a straightforward one, that no one disagrees with.⁵

He then quotes the Rambam (Maimonides) in his Commentary to Mishnah who explicitly states this as a general principle:⁶

"And it is known that the religious judge (dayan) should coerce a person to give charity, since it is a positive commandment (mitzvat aseh), and it is obligatory to flog the person until he fulfills that positive mitzvah which he is obligated to do at that time, until he dies, and this is a general rule for all positive commandments."

Shochetman cites additional halachic sources to the effect that “there is compulsion to observe a mitzvot even in cases where there is no explicit basis for it in the Talmud”.

Shochetman also discusses whether the authority to enforce these commandments lies only with the religious court (בית דין). He further explores whether this principle extends to prohibitive commandments (לא תעשה), and the answer is affirmative. The Ran (Rabbi Nissim of Gerona) states that if someone intends to violate a prohibitive commandment, the court has the authority to prevent this through all possible means, even via use of physical coercion.

Shochetman also raises the question of whether an individual, not part of the religious court, can physically enforce the mitzvot. He says that according to the Nesivos Hamishpat (a major early 19th century work), everyone is obligated to prevent others from committing a prohibition, even those who are not part of the religious court.⁷

Shochetman goes on to point out that in a modern context, since religious authorities cannot legally enforce commandments in Israel, the only means of enforcement would be through the Knesset, Israel's parliament. The question arises whether, halachically-speaking, the Knesset, being a secular body, has the authority to enforce religious commandments. Shochetman concludes by citing halachic sources, that halachically-speaking, the authority to physically enforce mitzvot is not solely with religious scholars; other entities can enforce religious commandments as well.

The practical application of these principles in the contemporary world is a different matter. Orthodox Jewish authorities generally do not enforce mitzvot through physical coercion today. It is a separate, and fascinating, historical question as to whether Orthodox Jewish authorities generally ever enforced mitzvot through physical coercion. Most contemporary communities place a high value on personal choice and spiritual growth, and most religious leaders guide their communities through teaching and influence rather than force.

That being said, the major sources cited earlier highlight religiously coercive tendencies, at least in theory. Compare also the famous opinion of the Rambam regarding the physical coercion of the Seven Laws of Noah, upon pain of death:⁸

"יפת תאר שלא רצתה להניח עבודה זרה אחר השנים עשר חדש. הורגין אותה. וכן עיר שהשלימה אין כורתין להן ברית עד שיכפרו בעבודה זרה ויאבדו את כל מקומותיה ויקבלו שאר המצות שנצטוו בני נח. שכל גוי שלא קבל מצות שנצטוו בני נח הורגין אותו אם ישנו תחת ידינו [...] וכן צוה משה רבנו מפי הגבורה לכף את כל באי העולם לקבל מצות שנצטוו בני נח. וכל מי שלא יקבל יהרג." (משנה תורה, ספר שופטים, הלכות מלכים ומלחמות, פרק ח' הלכה ט’-י')

“A Beautiful Captive Woman (yefat toar) who does not want to abandon idol worship after twelve months should be executed. Similarly, a treaty cannot be made with a city which desires to accept a peaceful settlement until they deny idol worship, destroy their places of worship, and accept the other Laws of Noah. For every gentile who does not accept the Laws of Noah must be executed if he is under our authority [...] Moses commanded, based on God’s instruction, to compel all the inhabitants of the world to accept the Laws of Noah. Anyone who does not accept these Laws should be executed.” (Mishneh Torah, vol. Kings and Wars, 8:9-10)

1.  Marc Shapiro has extensively explored the topic of what it means to say that a belief is Jewish, in his many writings, but especially in The Limits of Orthodox Theology (2003).

2.  See Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined (2011), for a monumental and exhaustive discussion of the long-term decline in violence over the course of human history.

3.  For an extensive discussion of the history of attempts for and against religious coercion in the modern state of Israel, see the lengthy Hebrew Wikipedia entry “Religious coercion in Israel” (כפייה דתית בישראל).

For an interesting sociological perspective, see Shayna Weiss, “Book Review: Between State and Synagogue: The Secularization of Contemporary Israel”, Journal of Church and State (2015). To summarize the relevant parts of Weiss’s review: Author Ben-Porat contends that the secularization of Israel is non-ideological and manages to sidestep traditional religious authority within the country. Based on a number of case studies, he shows increasing secular behaviors despite the restrictions imposed by Orthodox Jewish law. He argues that this is not due to direct confrontation with religious laws, but rather a circumvention of them through tactics like exploiting weakly enforced regulations. Ben-Porat differentiates ideology from practice, challenging the emphasis on ideology in previous studies.

4.  פרופ' אליאב שוחטמן, "חקיקה דתית בחברה חילונית"', מחניים גליון 13 (תשנ"ו), עמ' 293-270

5.  'דין "כופין על המצוות" הוא הלכה פשוטה שאין מי שחולק עליה.'

6.  רמב"ם בפירוש המשניות כתובות פרק ד'  משנה ו': "וידוע שיש לדיין לכוף את האדם על מתן הצדקה לפי שהיא מכלל מצות עשה שחובה להלקות את האדם עד שיקיים אותה המצות עשה שחל עליו חיוב עשייתה באותו העת או עד שימות, וזה כלל בכל מצות עשה."

Quotation based on citation in: 

פרשת תרומה – כפיה בצדקה, הרב יואל עמיטל - מאגר תורני - ישיבת שעלבים

7.  נתיבות משפט, סימן ג' ס"ק א': "גם מה שכתב [בסק"א] דאי שעבודא לאו דאורייתא והבית דין כופין בעי בי"ד [מומחין] דוקא לכפותו דהדיוטות לאו בני עישוי נינהו. נראה לפענ"ד דליתא, דכיון דדמי לעשה סוכה ואינו עושה דכופין אותו לקיים המצוה, כל אדם מצווה להפריש חבירו מאיסור אפילו מי שאינו בכלל בית דין, כדמוכח בב"ק כ"ח [ע"א] גבי נרצע שכלו ימיו, דיכול רבו להכותו כדי להפרישו מאיסור שפחה, ע"ש. ואי בעינן בגמר דין ג' והיינו לומר פלוני זכאי, יבואר אי"ה בסימן ה' [סק"ב]."

Quotation based on citation in: 

פרשת תרומה – כפיה בצדקה, הרב יואל עמיטל - מאגר תורני - ישיבת שעלבים

 Briefly noted also by R’ Jonathan Ziring, “Should There Be Civil Marriage in Israel?”. section # 11.

8.  Translation based on Touger, at Sefaria, with adjustments.