Some Notes on the Anthropomorphization of God in the Talmud
Anthropomorphism is the attribution of human traits, emotions, or intentions to non-human entities.
Yair Lorberbaum, In God’s Image: Myth, Theology, and Law in Classical Judaism (2015), Intro (I split into two paragraphs, for readability):
"[T]he tannaitic view of God is anthropomorphic: the deity reflected in their writings possesses a likeness and an image and a comprehensive, complex personality. Insofar as God is “human” he is not perfect – at least not in the common philosophical-speculative sense of the term. Yet this theosophy does not divest God of extraordinary and supernatural attributes, such as immortality, the ability to perform miracles, rulership over the world, the ability to foresee or even determine the future, the adoption and shedding of appearances, appearing and disappearing, etc.
The anthropomorphisms that are so characteristic of Biblical and Talmudic literature should not necessarily be understood as metaphors or mere poetry. It is often more accurate to read these anthropomorphisms literally, or at least to interpret them as being based on the assumption of a personal deity possessing both form and likeness."
Dora Lantos, Anthropomorphic Aspects Of The Rabbinic Tradition In Thirteenth Century Jewish-Christian Polemics (2017), MA Thesis In Medieval Studies, p. 12-5 (I added hyperlinks):
[Arthur] Marmorstein [in The old Rabbinic doctrine of God, Pt. 2: Essays in anthropomorphism (1937)] argues that from [the Bar Kochba period] period on, the anthropomorphic view became widespread and eventually gained prevalence in the amoraic period, whereas the allegorical concept remained marginal [...]1
Meir Bar-Ilan [in “The Hand of God. A Chapter in Rabbinic Anthropomorphisms” in G. Sed-Rajna (ed.), Rashi 1040-1990: Hommage a Ephraim E. Urbach (1993), pp. 321-335], when discussing the Talmudic concept of God’s hand disagrees with those scholars who argue that the rabbis of the Talmud did not believe in God’s corporeality [...]
Jacob Neusner [in The Incarnation of God: The Character of Divinity in Formative Judaism (1992)] agrees with Marmorstein and sees a gradual increase in the popularity of the doctrine of the corporeality of God culminating in the Babylonian Talmud, where God does not only have limbs and a face, but acquires a whole personality with mental, emotional, and physical traits [...]
Lantos goes on to write that the controversy over anthropomorphic statements in Jewish tradition began in the geonic period, mainly due to the influence of Islamic philosophy. With Islam as the state religion in the East, the distinction between philosophy and theology became less clear, significantly affecting Jewish theology. This was the second major attempt by Jews to integrate their religious beliefs with Hellenistic philosophy, the first being Philo of Alexandria's work, which didn't gain mainstream acceptance in rabbinic Judaism.
Three main approaches emerged to address this issue:
Adherence to the straightforward reading of the Talmud's teachings, taking them at face value.
Rationalist: Interpretation of these statements as pure allegories.
Kabbalistic: Viewing these statements as mystical indications of the nature of God.
This shift in perception was driven by both internal and external factors. Internally, the Karaite schism, where Karaite Jews rejected rabbinic traditions and criticized its anthropomorphic descriptions of God, played a significant role. Externally, the influence of Islam and Muslim critique further fueled this change.
David Stern, “Imitatio Hominis” (1922)
David Stern, “Imitatio Hominis: Anthropomorphism and the Character(s) of God in Rabbinic Literature”, in Prooftexts, 12, No. 2 (May 1992), pp. 151-2 points out that the depiction of God with human characteristics, is not a concept invented by the Talmudic sages. It is rooted in the Bible, which describes God with human features and emotions.
Examples include God having eyes and hands (Genesis 6:8, Exodus 31:28), exhibiting human-like actions (walking in the Garden of Eden, expressing regret in Genesis 6:6), and revealing Himself in a human form, as seen in Exodus 24:10 and Ezekiel 1:26.
(For a recent treatment of this fascinating topic, see the excellent accessible book by Francesca Stavrakopoulou, God: An Anatomy (2022).)
Stern goes on to say that the Rabbis inherited this tradition and expanded upon it, often depicting God with human limbs, portraying God in a very human image, such as wearing tefillin, studying Torah, and making legal decisions in the heavenly academy.
In midrash, particularly through parables (meshalim), the Rabbis depicted God in a way that reflects human kings, specifically resembling contemporary Roman emperors or their representatives. These portrayals were not vague or generic but were vivid and detailed, often showing God in a surprisingly human light, with emotions and behaviors that might be seen as undivine. This includes showing vulnerability, despotism, or injustice.
This anthropomorphic tradition also appears in non-parable narratives. For example, God is described as weeping over the destruction of the Temple and, in the story of the "oven of Akhnai," laughing and acknowledging defeat by the sages in a legal argument. These depictions challenge conventional expectations of divine behavior, showing a complex and humanized view of the divine in Rabbinic literature.
Stern continues (p. 155-6):
Neusner's audacious claim raises more questions than we can adequately deal with here. For one thing, many of his examples are drawn from rabbinic meshalim; yet Neusner entirely overlooks the parabolic form of these narratives, and in particular the intentional obliqueness of
the analogy they draw between God and their fictional protagonists; by virtue of that obliqueness, the authors of the meshalim manage to avoid directly likening God to the meshalim's human characters, and thus seriously complicate every attempt to interpret the parables' anthropomorphisms literally.
Still, there remain enough other instances of rabbinic anthropomorphism that can be read as indicating a belief in divine corporeality that it is imperative for us to take seriously Neusner's strongest argument, his methodological claim to reading anthropomorphic statements "to mean precisely what they say"-that is, as being "clear evidence of a corporeal conception of God," and not as "[merely] poetic characterization, or, indeed, what such a more spiritual interpretation would have required." And indeed, why not read these passages in the most literal fashion-at face value, as it were? Why not, on their basis, argue, as Neusner does, that the Rabbis must have believed that God was a corporeal being just like a human?
The fact of the matter is that, on purely literary and hermeneutical grounds, it will be impossible to prove that at least some anthropomorphic statements cannot or should not be read literally. On the other hand, the question of what the Rabbis themselves believed these statements to mean is also unanswerable in any definitive way.
If the Rabbis did indeed believe that God either possesses or could assume a human shape, they would not have been alone in the late antique world. Belief in the visibility of the gods as well as testimonies to divine appearances in human shape are well documented in pagan religion and literature even in late antiquity. In addition to the enormously complicated controversies in early Christianity concerning the divinity of Jesus' corporeality and his humanity, there are unambiguously anthropomorphic doctrines found in early Gnostic texts that may be related in one way or another to esoteric Jewish traditions.
But if one compares the pagan or Gnostic sources to the paucity of comparable evidence in rabbinic literature, or if one compares the extensive documentation surrounding the dogma of Jesus' divinity to the almost total absence of any such discussion in rabbinic literature, one cannot help but suspect that rabbinic anthropomorphisms may not have been intended to be taken as unequivocal and unambiguous sources for a belief among the Rabbis in God's literal corporeality.
Sanhedrin 95b - God appeared to Sennacherib as an old man (gavra saba), and angels appeared to him as men (gavrei)
In my mind, one of the most surprising such passages is a Talmudic expansion Sanhedrin 95b (section #16) of a literal reading of a Biblical verse in the Book of Isaiah (7:20):
ביום ההוא יגלח אדני בתער השכירה בעברי נהר במלך אשור את־הראש ושער הרגלים, וגם את־הזקן תספה
“In that day, my Sovereign will cut away with the razor that is hired beyond the Euphrates—with the king of Assyria —the hair of the head and the hair of the legs, and it shall clip off the beard as well.
According to the Talmudic narrative there, God appeared to Sennacherib as an old man and discussed the king's atrocities. God suggested Sennacherib change his appearance to avoid recognition by the kings of the east and west. Sennacherib agreed and sought scissors from ministering angels, who appeared as men grinding date pits. After a series of tasks – grinding pits for scissors and fetching fire for light – Sennacherib accidentally set his beard on fire, which also burned his hair, fulfilling the verse in Isaiah.
Here’s the first line in that Talmudic story, where God is introduced:
אתא קודשא בריך הוא ואדמי ליה כגברא סבא
The Holy One, Blessed be He, came and appeared to Sennacherib as an old man.
E.B: See also additional passages from Marmorstein and Lorberbaum quoted in “Anthropomorphism (Arthur Marmorstein & The Old Rabbinic Doctrine of God)”, jewish philosophy place.
fascinating post. i think there's a distinction missing. the idea of God being corporeal implies the corporeality is his essence. the examples here, most particularly the final, supposedly slam dunk, example, implies it is a choice in appearance. i.e., it is one thing to say God has a body, it is another to say he chose to manifest himself with a body (to say, communicate or dramatize a message). this is no different from angels, who do not have bodies, appearing as travelers in the desert or date grinders. it's a facade fitted to the mission -- but not a defining element of their existence.